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Refusal-to-Deal Cases of IP Rights in the Aftermarket of US
and EU Law: Convergence of Both Law Systems through
Speaking the Same Language of Law and Economics
Haris Apostolopoulos *
ABSTRACT
One of the most common ways in which abuse of dominance cases
could lead to action restricting Intellectual Property (IP) law is where
an IP right holder's refusal to deal inordinately restricts the develop-
ment of competition. According to Article 82 of the European Commu-
nity ("EC Article 82") and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, both US and
EU law intervene with regard to de facto monopolies in refusal-to-deal
cases based on an exclusive IP right "under exceptional circumstances."
The courts however, on both sides of the Atlantic, have not used a com-
mon language despite facing the same legal problem while handling it
with basically the same principles. Moreover, neither the US nor the EU
uses any economic argument at all. This article proposes a common
language that could be applied by the courts on both sides of the Atlan-
tic in refusal-to-deal cases. The proposed common language consists of
commonly understood legal terms and commonly accepted economic
analysis, comprising two cumulative steps: First the courts should ex-
amine if there is the "possibility of competition by substitution" and a
"de facto monopoly on the downstream market. " These two legal terms
should be the first two criteria for the finding of an anti-competitive
abuse of IP rights. The second step of the proposed analysis would con-
sist of an economic balancing between the pro- and anti-competitive
effects of the refusal of the IP owner to deal. This convergence would
bring some legal certainty to this area of law, especially through the
application of the two-step-test proposed here. Moreover, it would be-
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come an example for the resolution of refusal-to-deal cases at the inter-
face of IP and competition law for other developing countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevailing view today is that antitrust, by protecting competi-
tion, and intellectual property, by rewarding innovation, create incen-
tives to introduce new products. At the highest level of analysis,
intellectual property rights (IPR)' and competition policies are com-
plementary because they share a common concern to promote techni-
cal progress to the ultimate benefit of consumers (theory of
complementarity). 2 Under the theory of complementarity, the inter-
vention of competition laws apparently has to depend on the effects of
a given IP right and its exercise on the market. The IP system rests on
the idea of long-term innovation incentives. This is entirely consistent
with antitrust policy related to exclusionary conduct, which also fo-
cuses on dynamic competition and long-term effects. Firms are more
likely to innovate if they are at least somewhat protected against free-
riding. They are also more likely to innovate if they face strong com-
petition. The right holder is enabled to prevent competitors from ex-
ploiting the very subject matter of protection, but may not prohibit
the development and use of competing technology. Thus, IPRs ex-
clude only competition by imitation, but further competition by
substitution. 3.
One of the most common ways in which abuse of dominance cases
could lead to action restricting IP law is where an IP right holder's
1. The present thesis focuses mainly on the exclusive rights of copyright and patent law with
regard to Intellectual Property rights, but does not focus on trademark rights.
2. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (1990) ("[T]he two
bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry
and competition"). The Technology Guidelines recognize that generally intellectual property and
competition law are not in conflict; on the contrary:
[B]oth bodies of law share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare and
an efficient allocation of resources. Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic
component of an open and competitive market economy. Intellectual property rights
promote dynamic competition by encouraging undertakings to invest in developing
new or improved products and processes. So does competition by putting pressure on
undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both intellectual property rights and competition
are necessary to promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof.
Commission Notice No. 7/2004 of 27 Apr. 2004, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of
the EC Treaty to Technology transfer agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 2. See also Howard Morse,
Standard Setting and Antitrust: The Intersection between IP Rights and the Antitrust Laws, IP
LITIGATOR, May/June 2003, at 17, 18.
3. Hanns Ullrich, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Gemeinsamen Markt, 1EG-
WET-rBEWERBSRECHT 1101 (1997); Josef Drexl, IMS Health and Trinko - Antitrust Placebo for
Consumers Instead of Sound Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases, 35 INT'L REV. OF INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L.IIC 788, 805 (2004).
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refusal to deal inordinately restricts the development of competition.
First, there is a general category of dominance which applies to under-
takings of a firm in a powerful market position in which some effec-
tive competition continues to exist. Second, there is a special extreme
form of dominance, a de facto monopoly, where the competitor has no
ability to compete. However, even when an IP protected product
reaches the status of a de facto monopoly and falls within the scope of
EC Article 82 or Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the mere achievement
of that status is not itself viewed as abusive. A firm that has achieved
de facto monopoly status by virtue of its investment in R&D and IP
protection is normally entitled to continue to compete by exercising
its exclusionary rights even in aftermarkets."'4
However, there are cases where the abuse of a dominant position in
the upstream market that is being facilitated by the IP right can be
"transferred" to the neighboring downstream market: when the com-
petition is eliminated in the downstream market because of the refusal
of the IP right holder to license it to competitors.5 European law has
always started from the assumption that the leveraging of dominant
positions into other markets may constitute an abuse if success in the
neighboring market is not based on competition on the merits.6 Con-
duct can be abusive if it is characterized by an instrumental use of the
economic power bestowed by the dominant position to gain commer-
cial advantages, which is usually in adjacent markets. Abuses in this
category can also be referred to as market power leveraging abuses. 7
The two most important variants are tying and refusals to grant access
to a necessary input for downstream activities.8
According to EC Article 82 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, both
U.S. and EU law intervene with regard to a de facto monopoly in re-
fusal-to deal-cases based on an exclusive IP right "under exceptional
circumstances." 9 However, the courts on both sides of the Atlantic
4. Steven Anderman, Does the Microsoft Case offer a New Paradigm for the 'Exceptional Cir-
cumstances' Test and Compulsory Copyright Licenses under EC Competition Law?, 1(2) COMPE-
TITION L. REV. 9 (2004).
5. RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 200 (LexisNexis 2003) (1985); MESTMAECKER/
SCHWEITZER, EUROPAEISCHES WETrBEWERBSRECHT § 18, nr. 19 (C.H. Beck 2004); Case T-83/
91, Tetra Pak Int'l SA v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 755.
6. lmmenga/Mestmaecker/Moeschel, EG-Wettbewerbsrecht, 765 (1997).
7. AXEL BECKMERHAGEN, DIE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IM US-AMERIKANISCHEN
UND EUROPAEISCHEN KARTELLRECHT 140 (2002).
8. See Thomas Eilmansberger, How to Distinguish Good From Bad Competition Under Article
82 EC: In Search of Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses, 42 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 129, 155 (2005).
9. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (2000); Case C-418/01, IMS
Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039. See also
2007]
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have not, until now, used a common language, despite facing the same
legal problem and handling it with basically the same principles (e.g.
they do not presume market power from IP rights as such). Moreover,
they do not use any economic arguments at all, although the US law
facilitates an economic efficiency test and the EU law intends to adopt
an economic approach for the application of Art. 82 EC (Part V.B.).
This article points out the common legal approaches of the US and
EU law systems, handling refusal to deal cases with regard to IP
rights. Part II analyzes the presumption of market power from IP
rights as such. It then reveals how the US and EU courts have ap-
proached the "exceptional circumstances" criteria for the abuse of IP
rights in monopoly situation cases (Part III and IV). Part V ascertains
that the US and EU courts do not use economic arguments at all
(V.D.) and dictates the possibility of using common legal terms (V. C,
D, E, and F) for the definition of "exceptional circumstances" and the
resolution of such cases, which are understandable from both sides
(V.G.).
II. IP RIGHTS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF MARKET
POWER THEREOF
A. General Rule
Market power is the ability of a single seller to raise price and re-
strict output. Market power is typically associated with a departure
from the conditions necessary for the optional functioning of a mar-
ket: a sufficient number of buyers or sellers, relatively easy conditions
of entry and exit, or readily accessible information on market condi-
tions. Intellectual property law potentially confers market power be-
cause it creates barriers to competitors' entry into the relevant market
with the same good, and to a certain extent, with substitute goods. The
degree of market power is a function not only of how unique or so-
cially desirable the product is, but also of how effective the property
right is in erecting entry barriers that keep substitutes out of the mar-
ket. Antitrust is not opposed to market power, as such, if it is neces-
sary to achieve efficiencies and respects the need for incentives for
investment in research and development. If a firm builds market
power through innovation, investment, and marketing activities, it is
perfectly legal.10 Market power is less durable in markets character-
STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 173
(Clarendon Press 1998).
10. MASSIMO MOTrA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2004).
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ized by a high level of innovation, and thus, by dependence on IP
rights.
Intellectual property cannot be presumed to establish market
power.1 While intellectual property grants exclusive rights, these
rights are not monopolies in the economic sense; they do not necessa-
rily provide a large share of any commercial market and they do not
necessarily lead to the ability to raise prices in a market. Where prod-
ucts are differentiated, a company can have constrained market power
without being a monopolist. This is particularly likely in markets in
which IP rights are important.12 An IP right may actually prove so
successful that it gives rise to a market dominant position. Such a posi-
tion, however, is not the result of IP protection, but rather, of the
market situation (lock-in, network effects). 13 Market power can only
be determined by an actual economic analysis of the anti- and pro-
competitive aspects of the actual use and ownership of the specific
piece of intellectual property. A single patent, for example, and espe-
cially a copyright, may have dozens of close substitutes.1 4 The mere
presence of an intellectual property right does not permit an antitrust
enforcer to skip the crucial steps of market definition and determining
market effects.
In the view of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, the idea that IP rights cannot be presumed to create
market power is a settled question.15 The European Court of Justice
(ECJ) adopts the same approach.' 6 In Deutsche Grammophon v.
Metro-Grossmarkte, the ECJ held that the exercise of exclusive distri-
bution rights under a sound recording copyright does not automati-
cally translate to dominance; there must be some further showing of
effective competition over a considerable part of the relevant mar-
ket. 17 Similarly, in Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Tele-
vision Publications Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission of the European
11. Debra A. Valentine, Abuse of Dominance in Relation to Intellectual Property: US Perspec-
tives and the ITEL cases, 3 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L, 73, 76 (2000).
12. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET. AL., IP and Antitrust 10-9 (Aspen Law & Business 2006).
13. Josef Drexl, IMS Health and Trinko - Antitrust Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound
Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases, 35 INT'L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 788,
792 (2004).
14. RALPH JONAS ET. AL., AM. BAR Assoc., INTELL. PROP. MISUSE: LICENSING AND LITIGA-
TION 165, 184 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 1999).
15. Russell Lombardy, The Myth of Market Power: Why Market Power Should Not be Pre-
sumed When Applying Antitrust Principles to the Analysis of the Tying Agreements Involving
Intellectual Property, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 449, 451 (1996).
16. See Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-GroSSmarkte
GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487.
17. Id. at 1 16.
2007]
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Communities, the ECJ held that mere ownership of IP rights, without
more, does not establish dominance. 18
Consequently, the general approach both in the US and EU is to
avoid rigid tests and instead rely on a review of the likely economic
effects to the marketplace as a whole, both in the short term and over
the long term, factoring in incentives for pro-competitive innovation.
Moreover, the presumption of market power would encourage routine
filing of tying antitrust claims because the accusers would not need to
confront market realities. The increased risk of antitrust liability may
discourage IP right owners from enforcing their rights. Both IP law
and competition law seek to maintain dynamic, innovative markets far
into the future, and to that end they are willing to tolerate a degree of
private reward and market power in the present day.
B. The Recent Supreme Court Case Illinois. Tool Works, Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc.19
In Independent Ink, the Federal Circuit, which handles all direct
patent appeals in the US, held that Supreme Court precedent20 com-
pelled it to conclude that a patent does raise a presumption of market
power in an IP tying case.21 But even the Federal Circuit disagreed
with that presumption; in fact, the Federal Circuit's opinion invited
the Supreme Court to reverse, which is exactly what the Supreme
Court did.22
Illinois Toolwork (ITW) manufactured printing systems made up of
piezoelectric impulse jet print heads and inks for use in packaging as-
sembly lines. 23 Patents covered the print head, the ink bottle, and the
connection between them. 24 ITW's license required OEM customers
(the assembly line manufacturers) to purchase ink from ITW (license
didn't bind end users, though). 25 Plaintiff claimed this requirement
constituted a tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.26 The Supreme Court ruled:
18. Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Indep. Television Publ'ns Ltd. (ITP) v.
Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 46.
19. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
20. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46 (1962) (ruling that "when the tying product is
patented or copyrighted ... [sufficiency] of economic power is presumed"). See generally Jeffer-
son Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters.,
Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 619 (1977).





26. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
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Nothing in our opinion [in Jefferson Parish] suggested a rebuttable
presumption of market power applicable to tying arrangements in-
volving a patent on the tying good... It described the rule that a
contract to sell a patented product on condition that the purchaser
buy unpatented goods exclusively from the patentee is a per se vio-
lation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.2 7
The 1988 patent law amendment requires "proof of market power in
the relevant market" for patent misuse defense. 28 The 1988 amend-
ment invites a reappraisal of the per se rule announced in International
Salt.29 The Court concluded:
[T]ying arrangements involving patented products should be evalu-
ated under the standards applied in cases like Fortner II and Jeffer-
son Parish rather than under the per se rule applied in Morton Salt
and Loew's... Liability must be supported by proof of power in the
relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.30
The first question, which the Court examined, was whether the pre-
sumption of market power in a patented product should survive as a
matter of antitrust law. 31 It answered:
Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most economists
have all reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily
confer market power upon the patentee. Today, we reach the same
conclusion, and therefore hold that, in all cases involving a tying
arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market
power in the tying product. 32
What the Supreme Court did through this decision is make clear that
there is no market power presumption through the existence of pat-
ents as such. The courts should demand real proof of such market
power. However, one could argue that the decision is limited to patent
tying and that copyright market power presumption remains arguably
intact. But the decision's logic should extend due to legal certainty
and similarity of the cases to copyrights as well.
III. U.S. LAW
A. First Principles
This section discusses how the U.S. legal system (Part C. I.) and its
courts (C. II., III.) approach the refusal to license cases33 and if this
27. Id.





33. It will be a rather sketchy presentation of the US refusal-to-deal cases, since the purpose
of this paper is just to show indicatively how the US courts have treated such cases. For a more
2007]
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approach is similar to the EU's approach to Antitrust enforcement,
which focuses on specific anticompetitive actions, as judged by their
effects on markets and consumer welfare. In other words, cases at the
intersection between intellectual property and antitrust law have been
analyzed in the U.S. by examining the impact on economic incentives
to innovate and balancing them against anticompetitive effects. There
is no quarrel with the fundamental rule that a patent holder has no
obligation to license or sell in the first instance.34 A patent holder is
not under any general obligation to create competition against itself
within the scope of its patent.35 Antitrust law does not itself impose an
obligation to use or license intellectual property rights, such that a
refusal to use or license the right would violate the antitrust laws. Fur-
ther, such an obligation would conflict directly with the rights granted
to an intellectual property owner by the intellectual property laws.
Thus, as a general rule, there is no antitrust obligation either to use or
license a patent.
B. Refusal-to-Deal Cases
In Data General v. Grumman Systems Support,36 the First Circuit
confronted an aftermarket exclusion claim. The Independent Service
Organizations (ISOs) were repairing computer hardware, and the
"part" they needed access to was Data General's copyrighted diagnos-
tic software. 37 The Court created a rebuttable presumption designed to
take the copyright into account: "While exclusionary conduct can in-
clude a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an au-
thor's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a
presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to
consumers". 38 Rebuttable presumptions offer somewhat less predict-
ability, but permit courts to delve into the factual context of the cases
before them in order to determine the competitive effect.
lengthy analysis, see among others Kenneth L. Glazer and Abbott B Libsky, Jr., Unilateral Re-
fusals to Deal Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 749 (1995).
34. Debra A. Valentine, Abuse of Dominance in Relation to Intellectual Property: US Perspec-
tives and the ITEL cases, 3/2000 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L, 73, 74 (2000); JAMES B. KOBAK,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST, 377, 392 (Bender ed., Practicing Law Institute 2003).
35. See, e.g., Cont'l Paper Bag Comp. v. E. Paper Bag Comp., 210 U.S. 405 (1908); SCM Corp.
v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[W]here a patent has been lawfully ac-
quired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws cannot trigger liability under the
antitrust laws.").
36. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). For a
more analytical presentation of the refusal to deal cases in the US, see JAMES B. KOBAK, INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST, 377, 401 (Bender ed., Practising Law Institute 2003).
37. Data General Corp., 36 F.3d 1147.
38. Id. at 1187.
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In its 1997 Kodak decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a refusal to
license patented parts was a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.39 The
court reasoned that patents may have given Kodak a monopoly on
some of its parts, but by refusing to sell the parts to independent re-
pair technicians, Kodak was effectively creating a second monopoly in
the relevant market for service.40 The Kodak patents on aftermarket
parts were of value in both the market for the parts themselves and
the complementary market for servicing photocopiers. 41 This fact, as
far as the Ninth Circuit was concerned, meant that Kodak had a duty
to sell its parts. Otherwise, it would be reaping the advantages of mo-
nopoly in both the parts market and the service market. 42
The Federal Circuit also concluded in In re Independent Service Or-
ganizations Antitrust Litigation that a patentee can refuse to license or
sell, and is immune under the antitrust laws for that refusal, unless one
of the following conditions applies: (1) the patent was obtained by
fraud on the PTO; (2) the suit to enforce the patent was "sham" - as
that term was defined by the Supreme Court;43 or (3) the patent was
used as part of a tie-in strategy to extend market power beyond the
legitimate confines of the patent grant.44
In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko,
L.L.P.,45 the United States Supreme Court found that private plain-
tiffs did not state an antitrust claim when they alleged a failure by a
communications provider, Verizon, to provide adequate assistance to
its rivals:46 Compelling firms to share the source of their advantage
"may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to in-
vest in those economically beneficial facilities" and "also requires an-
titrust courts to act as central planners. . .a role for which they are ill
suited. ' 47 An enforcement agency should thus not impose a duty to
deal that it cannot reasonably supervise, since this risks assuming the
day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency.48 There were
39. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1094 (1998); see JAMES S.VENIT AND JOHN J. KALLAUGHER, Fordham Corp. Law Inst.,
INT'L ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 315, 317 (Transnational Juris Publications 1994).
40. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Prof l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49
(1993).).
44. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
45. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 408.
48. Id. at 415 (quoting Phillip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989)).
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a number of reasons given in Trinko for refusing to impose a duty to
deal, including the absence of an earlier, voluntary business relation-
ship between the defendant and its competitors49 and the presence of
an extensive regulatory framework dealing with the issues that the
plaintiff sought to have governed by the antitrust laws. 50
C. The Particularity of U.S. Law with Regard to the Misuse and
Merger Doctrines
The U.S. law does not approach the interface issues between Intel-
lectual Property and Antitrust law only through Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act as abuse of monopoly; U.S. law also approaches the issues
internally in the IP system itself through the doctrines of misuse and
merger, which limit the legal monopoly of the IP owner. The merger
doctrine holds that if an idea and the way to express it are so intri-
cately tied that the ways of expression have little possible variation,
there will not be copyright infringement, lest the copyright prevent
others from expressing the same idea (idea/expression distinction). 51
Moreover, the U.S. courts use another flexible and powerful tool -
the misuse defense - in order to avoid the adverse effects of compul-
sory licensing on innovation. 52 Actually, the misuse doctrine is
brought by the defendants as an "aggressive" defense against the
plaintiff who misuses his/her IP patent or copyright. The courts can, in
any case, use the flexible misuse doctrine as a balancing tool when
deciding cases at the interface of intellectual property and competition
law. However, because of the legal uncertainty of such a fact-specific
misuse approach and the unforeseeable weakening of IP rights in
favor of the competition process, especially in a fiction as the Internal
Market of the EU, such a misuse defense could not be applied practi-
cally in EU law. The misuse doctrine "arose to restrain practices that
did not in themselves violate any law, but that drew anticompetitive
strength from the patent right, and thus were deemed to be contrary
to public policy."' 53 The policy rationale was that the misuse doctrine
would prevent the IP owner from using the IP right to obtain benefits
beyond those granted by statute.54 While the doctrine "has evolved
separately from the antitrust laws... it is used to attack patent licens-
49. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
50. Id. at 412-13.
51. Definition found on Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merger-doctrine (last vis-
ited February 25, 2007).
52. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the
New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 550 (2001).
53. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
54. Id.
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ing practices that are claimed to be undesirable from a public policy
standpoint. ' 55 If successful, a misuse defense renders the patent unen-
forceable against anyone until the misuse has been eliminated and the
effects on the marketplace have been purged. 56
As a general rule, the misuse doctrine has a broader scope than that
of antitrust laws. Although there is a large amount of overlap between
the two, as long as antitrust concerns such as market structure, intent,
and anticompetitive effect can be met. However, the misuse doctrine
may limit the validity of an IP right for behavior that does not rise to
the level of an antitrust violation. 57 With the exception of non-eco-
nomic reasons why the doctrine should apply (e.g. fraud on the patent
office), this represents a serious flaw in the doctrine itself.5 8 The test
the Federal Circuit uses in its patent misuse jurisprudence examines
whether, "the patentee has impermissibly broadened the physical or
temporal scope of the patent with anti-competitive effect. '59
Two fairly recent cases in the U.S. have shed light on the danger to
eliminate competitive products from a secondary market through the
imposition of IP rights. The Sixth Circuit case Lexmark International,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.60 referred to ink for printers.
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.61 was about the
market-control of remote-controllers of automatic garage doors. What
the competitors of the copyright owner at the secondary market
needed in both cases was first access to the protected computer pro-
gram - that was only possible after circumvention of the technical pre-
cautionary measures - and then the reproduction of the program as
such in order to be able to offer competitive ink for printers or remote
controllers. The Sixth Circuit doubted the copyrightability of the rele-
vant computer programs, ruling that in a situation where external fac-
tors like technical specifications, hardware or software standards,
programming practices, or just efficiency considerations limit the
choice of possible alternatives on the specific computer program, then
55. Roger B. Andewelt, Chief, Intellectual Prop. Section, Antitrust Div., Competition Policy
and the Patent Misuse Doctrine, Remarks Before the D.C. Bar Ass'n (Nov. 3, 1982), 25 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 41, 42 (1982).
56. Id.
57. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969).
58. Id.
59. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (internal quo-
tations omitted).
60. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
61. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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there is a merger ("merger doctrine" 62) of the (non-copyrightable)
idea and expression, and as a result, there is no copyrightability of the
computer program. As opposed to U.S. law, the European copyright
regime does not have a merger or misuse doctrine that could possibly
facilitate flexibility by the legal judgment of a case. This seems to be
problematic in light of the relatively shallow threshold, especially for
the protection of computer programs.
IV. EU LAW
A. First Principles
The EU law, due to institutional and structural impediments, ap-
proaches the interaction between IP law and competition law through
EC Article 82.63 The flexible misuse doctrine cannot apply Union-
wide, since it is difficult for the varying national intellectual property
policies to be incorporated into the construction of Union-wide com-
petition law, and it is impossible for the national courts to incorporate
European competition policy concerns into their national intellectual
property laws.
Under EC Article 82, competition law can only act in "exceptional
circumstances" to place a limit on the lawful exercise of intellectual
property rights.64 The existence or the essence of intellectual property
rights is not affected by the rules on competition. 65 Under EU law, the
Volvo decision still defines the core principle in applying EC Article
82 to intellectual property matters: the refusal to license a right as
such does not constitute an abuse of a dominant position. 66 In other
words, the EU law, like the U.S. law, disrupts the balance between IP
protection and competition law in favor of the latter only in "excep-
tional circumstances." Otherwise, the rule remains that IP rights
should be enforced.
62. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 535, 539, 542-44; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1879)
(explaining that while a book describing a bookkeeping system is worthy of copyright protection,
the underlying method described is not).
63. ANDREAS Heinemann, Immaterialgiterschutz in der Wettbewerbsordnung 303 (Tiibingen
2002).
64. Id.
65. INGE GOVAERE, The Use and Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in EC Law 104
(Sweet & Maxwell 1996).
66. Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd.,1988 E.C.R. 6211 8.
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B. Refusal-to-Deal Cases
In Oscar Bronner,67 the ECJ identified the required "exceptional
circumstances" as involving the following conditions: (1) that the re-
fusal would be likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspa-
per market by Oscar Bronner; (2) that the refusal could not be
objectively justified; and (3) that the service be indispensable to carry-
ing on Oscar Bronner's business, whereby there was no actual or po-
tential substitute.
The ECJ then ruled in Magill68 that, in order to find an abuse, there
must be three cumulative conditions: (i) the product to which the re-
fusal to supply relates is an indispensable input required for the mar-
keting of a new product which the holder of the IPR does not offer
and for which there is a potential demand; (ii) there is no justification
for such refusal; and (iii) the dominant company reserves for itself a
secondary downstream market. 69 The first condition requires two ele-
ments: the indispensability of the input and the failure of the IP right
owner to exploit its rights to offer the downstream product. The status
of the second condition identified by the ECJ depends on whether
"objective justification" includes the reward for innovation that un-
derlies the grant of a monopoly under IP law. The third condition
identified by the ECJ is arguably the only condition inconsistent with
the existence of the IP right since a refusal to license is inherent in the
legal monopoly conferred by the IP right.
The ECJ made the point that the dominant position of the TV com-
panies was based on the de facto monopoly enjoyed by them by force
of circumstances over the information used to compile listings for TV
programs. 70 It emphasized that the true test of market dominance was
possession of economic strength in a market, i.e. the ability to behave
independently of competitors and consumers, 71 a test which presup-
poses an economic analysis of market strength. However, if mere
ownership of the IP right occurs in conjunction with a de facto monop-
oly on a market, and that is sufficient to justify a finding of domi-
nance, then the existence of ownership alone can confer dominance. 72
67. Case 7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791 11 29, 34, 45.
68. Joined Cases C-241/91 & 242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. European Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R.
485.
69. Matthias Leistner, Intellectual Property and Competition Law: The European Develop-
ment from Magill to IMS Health Compared to Recent German and US Case Law, ZWeR 138, 144
(2005).
70. STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW AND IP RiGHTs 209 (1998).
71. Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461 30.
72. See ANDERMAN, at 209.
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The ECJ, in IMS Health,73 concluded that it is possible to interfere
with the specific subject matter of an IP right on the basis of EC Arti-
cle 82 (imposing compulsory licensing on the right holder) when spe-
cial circumstances exist: (a) the protected product or service must be
indispensable for carrying on a particular business, (b) the refusal is
such as to exclude any competition on the secondary market, (c) the
refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is
potential consumer demand and (d) the refusal is not objectively justi-
fied.74 In reaching this conclusion, the ECJ stated that it was sufficient
that "a potential market or even a hypothetical market can be identi-
fied," noting that such would be the case where "the products or ser-
vices are indispensable in order to carry on a particular business and
where there is an actual demand for them on the part of undertakings
which seek to carry on the business for which they are indispensa-
ble."' 75 "[Tihe interest of [the] consumers in IMS Health did not con-
sist in getting a new product, but in having a larger number of
competing suppliers in the downstream service market who offer com-
parable service using the same brick structure. '76
In Microsoft, the Commission examined the indispensability of in-
terface information against the existence of actual or potential substi-
tutes.77 According to the Commission, neither reverse engineering,
nor open industry standards, nor the access ensured by the communi-
cation licensing program created in the U.S. are alternative ways for
Microsoft competitors to achieve interoperability of their products. 78
The Commission noted that "Microsoft's refusal puts Microsoft's com-
petitors at a strong disadvantage in the workgroup server operating
system market, to an extent where there is a risk of elimination of
competition. '79 The crucial question for the Commission seems to be
whether the refusal to license reduces the incentives to innovate in the
whole industry. Microsoft's incentives to innovate in the workgroup
server operating system will be reduced in case of non-disclosure be-
cause of the absence of competitive pressure. There will be no further
73. Case 418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004
E.C.R. 1-5039.
74. Daniel Kanter, IP and Compulsory Licensing on Both Sides of the Atlantic - An Appropri-
ate Antitrust Remedy or a Cutback on Innovation, 27(7) EUR. COMPETITION. L. REV. 351-365,
355 (2006); see also Leistner, supra note 69, at 148.
75. IMS Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039 44.
76. Josef Drexl, IMS Health and Trinko - Antitrust Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound
Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases, 35 IIC 788, 803 (2004).
77. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 4 C.M.L.R. 5 T 2 (2005).
78. Id. 9 143
79. VALENTINE KORAH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EC COMPETITION
RULES, 155 (2006) (noting Microsoft decision at recital 589).
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analysis here of the Microsoft case since the European case concen-
trated "on the problems of server software markets and integration of
the media player into the operating system," whereas the U. S. case
focused "on the browser and the Java problem." 80
IV. THE WAY OF CONVERGING THE Two SYSTEMS THROUGH
SPEAKING THE SAME LANGUAGE OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS
A. Introduction
The above presentation of how the U.S. and EU legal systems ap-
proach the interface between IP and competition law with regard to
refusal-to-deal cases has demonstrated one principle: even if there are
institutional, procedural, and structural differences, there is a single
language that is, and could be, similarly spoken by the U.S. and EU
courts. This language consists of commonly understood legal terms
and economic analysis.8 ' The proposed common language that could
be applied by the courts on both sides of the Atlantic in refusal-to-
deal cases includes two cumulative steps: First, the courts should ex-
amine whether there is the "possibility of competition by substitu-
tion" 82 and a "de facto monopoly on the downstream market. '83
These two legal terms should be the first two criteria for the finding of
an anti-competitive abuse of IP rights.84 The second step of the pro-
posed analysis would consist of an economic balancing between the
pro- and anti- competitive effects of the IP owner's refusal to deal.8 5
Especially now that the U.S. and EU competition laws seem to ori-
entate themselves toward an economic-based approach of both Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act and EC Article 82,86 a way of bringing
together the legal and economic language of the U.S. Supreme Court
and the ECJ seems more possible and feasible than ever. The pro-
posed common language is not only a game with words, as its applica-
tion for the hypothetical resolution of two already existing cases
before the ECJ and the U. S. Supreme Court shows.87 It is a method
80. Andreas Heinemann, Compulsory Licenses and Product Integration in European Competi-
tion Law, 36 IIC 2005, 63, 75 (2005). There could be a comparison of the U.S. and E.U. case only
with regard to the remedies imposed. See id. at 78.
81. See infra Part V.C.
82. See infra Part V.D.
83. See infra Part V.E.
84. Similarly for an abandonment of the "new product"- requirement. Leistner, supra note 69,
at 161.
85. See infra Part V.F.
86. See infra Part V.B.
87. See infra Part V.G.
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of communication between the two legal systems, a way for them to
see the same things similarly through a common legal treatment. It is a
way of converging the two legal systems which have the most devel-
oped IP and Antitrust laws. This convergence could bring some legal
certainty into this area of law, especially through the application of
the proposed two-step-test, and would become an example for the res-
olution of refusal to deal cases at the interface of IP and competition
law for other developing countries.
B. The Current Discussion in the EU for the Application of EC
Article 82 on an "Economic Approach" Basis
The EU Commission has recently begun an internal examination of
the policy underlying EC Article 82 and the way in which the Com-
mission should enforce that policy.88 The examination suggests a
framework for the continued rigorous enforcement of Article 82,
building on the economic analysis carried out in recent cases, and set-
ting out one possible methodology for the assessment of some com-
mon abusive practices. An economic-based approach to the
application of Article 82 implies that the assessment of each specific
case will not be based on the form that a particular business practice
takes (for example, exclusive dealing, tying, etc.), but rather, will be
based on the assessment of the anti-competitive effects generated by
business behavior. This implies that competition authorities will need
to identify a competitive harm, and assess the extent to which such a
negative effect on consumers is potentially outweighed by efficiency
gains. The identification of competitive harm requires spelling out a
consistent business behavior based on sound economics and sup-
ported by facts and empirical evidence. An economics-based approach
will naturally lend itself to a "rule of reason" approach to competition
policy, since careful consideration of the specifics of each case is
needed, and this is likely to be especially difficult under per se rules.
In an effects-based approach, the focus is on the use of well-estab-
lished economic analysis. The ultimate goal is to focus on the impor-
tant competitive harms while preserving and encouraging efficiency.
The economic approach to EC Article 82 is supposed to provide a
flexible framework that fosters increased productivity and growth of
benefits to consumers. The standard for assessing whether a given
practice is detrimental to competition or whether it is a legitimate tool
88. See Press Release, The European Commission, Competition: Commission Publishes Dis-
cussion Paper on Abuse of Dominance (Dec. 19, 2005), at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/05/1626&format=HTML&aged=O&Ianguage=EN&guiLanguage=EN
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of competition should be derived from the effects of the practice on
consumers.
Moving from a form-based to an effects-based approach has impor-
tant implications for procedure. Whereas under a form-based ap-
proach, it is enough to verify that (i) a firm is dominant, and (ii) a
certain form of behavior is practiced, an effects-based approach re-
quires the verification of competitive harm. To do so, the authority
must analyze the practice in question to see whether there is a consis-
tent and verifiable economic account of significant competitive harm.
The account should be both based on sound economic analysis and
grounded on facts. It is, however, necessary to ensure the consistency
of the treatment of the various practices that can serve the same an-
ticompetitive effect. This also contributes to enhancing the predict-
ability and, consequently, the effectiveness of competition policy
enforcement.
Once a competitive harm has been identified and the relevant facts
established, the next step should be to see if pro-competitive effects
might counterbalance them. There again, an economic approach first
identifies the nature of the benefit for competition and the facts that
need to be established. It is only after these steps that a proper bal-
ance can be assessed. It is obvious from the discussion above that the
approach taken in applying EC Article 82 is becoming analogous to
the approach taken in applying Section 2 of the Sherman Act. EU
competition law has distanced itself from the normative approach us-
ing the principles of "objective justification" and' "proportionality,"
which were mainly followed until now in applying EC Article 82 to a
competitive conduct,89 in favor of following the economic effects-
based approach under U.S. law.
C. The Courts Should at Least Speak a Common Legal and
Economic Language
As shown above, the courts on the two sides of the Atlantic have
not managed to use a common legal or economic language, although
they could and it would appear that the basic application of the no-
tions of innovation, competition and indispensability is the same.90 An
analysis according to sound economics, which tends to be internation-
ally spoken and admitted, is absent from the decisions of both the
Supreme Court and the ECJ. Moreover, the courts use a legal lan-
89. WHISH, supra note 5, at 189; MESTMAECKERISCHWEITZER, supra note 5. at 39.
90. Daniel Kanter, IP and Compulsory Licensing on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 2006 EUR.
COMPETITION. L. REV. 351, 363 (2006).
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guage with terms that cannot be mutually understood and adopted.
For example, the ECJ ruled in IMS Health that "the refusal in ques-
tion must concern a product that is indispensable for the production of
a new product for which there is an unsatisfied consumer demand."
Instead, it could rule "the refusal in question must concern a product
that creates a de facto monopoly for the competition by substitution in
the downstream market and thus causes anticompetitive effects in the
market." 91 Terms, like "de facto monopoly on the downstream mar-
ket" instead of "indispensability;" "possibility of competition by sub-
stitution" instead of "new product in the downstream market;" and an
economic efficiency test - balancing the pro- and anti-competitive ef-
fects - instead of "unjustified refusal to give access" or "objective/
legitimate business justification of the refusal" are, or at least could
be, commonly perceived objectively both in the U.S. and EU. Let us
now take a look at the proposed legal terms and definitions that are
commonly understood by U.S. and EU enforcers.
D. The Distinction between Competition by Substitution and
Competition by Imitation and its Implications
In its Guidelines on the Transfer Technology Regulation
(TTBER),92 the Commission has sufficiently made clear that IP rights
and competition law coincide in promoting innovation and dynamic
competition by excluding imitation.93 The objective of the IP right is
to exclude others from imitation, so as to incite them to compete by
substitution. Intellectual property protection reacts to the phenome-
non of copying intangible goods by excluding the freedom to compete
by imitation, but it does not exclude the possibility of developing a
superior intangible good that could compete with the prior good
(competition by substitution). Dynamic efficiency, that is, creating in-
centives for innovation and competitive behavior, is enhanced by
91. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004
E.C.R. 1-5039; see Leistner, supra note 69, at 152, (addressing "a new and economically orien-
tated indispensability-test").
92. Commission Regulation 772/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11 (2004); see generally Fiona Carlin
& Stephanie Pautke, The Last of its Kind: The Review of the Technology Transfer Block Exemp-
tion Regulation, 24 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 601 (2004); Cyril Ritter, The New Technology Transfer
Block Exemption under EC Competition Law, 31 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION, 161
(2004).
93. Hanns Ullrich, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Gemeinsamen Markt,
1EG-WE-rBEWERBSRECHT 1101 (1997)
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competition by substitution and requires the exclusion of competition
by imitation.94
Two decisions of the ECJ could give a good illustration of the dis-
tinction between competition by imitation and competition by substi-
tution. The competitor who simply intends to imitate the
achievements of the right holder does not deserve any protection by
competition law (IMS Health), in contrast to a competitor who would
be prevented from placing a new product on the market without the
grant of the license (Magill). It is difficult however, to imagine that the
"new product rule" of the ECJ would work in a case in which the IP
system is not deficient but external circumstances prevent the compet-
itor from placing a new product on the market. In such a situation, as
for example most of the cases involving software licensing agree-
ments, competition by substitution, i.e. a new product, is not pre-
vented by the refusal to grant the license,95 but by the lock-in effect
and possible network effects in the given market. Thus, the examina-
tion, if there are some network and lock-in effects limiting any market
access, needs a concrete market analysis.
Network effects arise when the value of a network increases with
the number of its users. A single firm, perhaps because it is the first
mover, becomes or threatens to become the only supplier of certain
products or services because of the value of compatibility or inter-
operability. Consumers are more likely to remain with the established
network because of their sunk costs (sometimes referred to as "lock-
in") and suppliers of complementary products will tailor those prod-
ucts to the established network and resist preparing products for
would-be challengers. In that event, network dominance itself be-
comes a formidable barrier to entry. In Europe, the Commission
stated that, where a de facto industry standard emerges such as the
software or the phone service industry, "[t]he main concern will then
be to ensure that these standards are as open as possible and applied
in a clear non-discriminatory manner. To avoid elimination of compe-
tition in the relevant market(s), access to the standard must be possi-
ble for third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms."
96
94. Josef Drexl, IMS Health and Trinko - Antitrust Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound
Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases, 35 IN-r'L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 788,
805 (2005).
95. See, e.g., Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co.
KG, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039; see also Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE v. Commission,
1995 E.C.R. 1-743 (1995).
96. Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2001 O.J. (C 3) 2, 25.
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The ECJ seems to apply a concept of innovation which fits some
cases but not others.97 If the net effect of compelling a license is "a
positive level of innovation of the whole industry, then intervening is
considered welfare enhancing". 98 Now that protection has moved up-
stream to give right holders control over a particular innovation op-
portunity in exchange for contributing the insight that created it,
competition law must be structured to prevent right holders from
leveraging control over the innovation opportunity in one product
market into control over innovation opportunities in other product
markets.
The first criterion of "possibility of competition by substitution,"
which is proposed here, presupposes that there is no technical or de
facto possibility of substitution. For example, the copyright-protected
TV listings in the Magill case could not be substituted. A substitution
is more difficult by copyrights than by other rights, like patents. A
bottleneck situation can result not only through the technical impossi-
bility of substitution, but also through the fact that a substitute is eco-
nomically impossible. This depends not on subjective intentions, but
on objective economic criteria. The development of a profitable sub-
stitute must not be objectively possible, in order to find abuse of IP
rights.
E. The Leveraging Element and de facto Monopoly
By refusing to license the intellectual property right, the dominant
company is not merely using the right in the market for the product or
service with which the right is primarily concerned, but is using it to
obtain leverage or to protect itself from competition in another, dis-
tinct, market.99 This "monopoly leveraging" 1°° applies in two market
97. Josef Drexl, Abuse of Dominance in Licensing and Refusal to License: A 'More Economi-
cal Approach' to Competition by Imitation and to Competition by Substitution, 10 EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2005: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 647 (2005).
98. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 4 C.M.L.R. 5, 1 783 (2005).
99. See JOHN TEMPLE LANG, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITY ANTITRUST LAW 19 (2002) (for the Department of Justice/Federal Trade
Commission Hearings, Washington DC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522
langdoc.pdf.
100. When a monopolist abuses its monopoly power in one market to gain an improper ad-
vantage or to destroy threatened competition in an adjacent market in which it also operates.
Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 150 (4th Cir. 1990)
("... the central concern in an essential facilities claim is whether market power in one market is
being used to create or further a monopoly in another market."); see also Twin Labs., Inc. v.
Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The policy behind prohibiting denial
of an essential facility to a competitor... is to prevent a monopolist in a given market... from
using its power to inhibit competition in another market.").
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situations because a competitor in the downstream market that gains
control of a necessary input is not offering a better or a cheaper prod-
uct in the downstream market, but only getting power to harm con-
sumers in that market by shutting out its competitors. 01
The main function of the IP rights in such cases is to exclude third
parties from the secondary market, which stands closest to the pri-
mary market. 10 2 There is certainly an influence on the competition
process when a dominant firm tries to transfer its market power to
another neighboring market in order to shield this market against any
competition. In the primary market, the exclusionary effect of the IP
right takes precedence over competition law. Only when the IP owner
prevents the access to a secondary market should there be a control of
the IP right through competition law. Without acknowledging that the
IMS Health case was a typical "leveraging" case, the ECJ ruled that a
refusal to license IMS Health could quite possibly lead to a total cut-
off of a secondary market.10 3
The competitor must also need the IP right in order to access the
secondary market. The second criterion, proposed here, of the "de
facto monopoly on a downstream market" refers to the phenomenon
where the right, that cannot be substituted, blocks access to another
market. The abuse in this case consists of "monopoly leveraging" - the
transfer of market power to other markets. °4 The question, when
there are one or two markets related to each other, should be an-
swered through the formula of the "functional interchangeability."
Only if the product of the competitor is not functionally interchangea-
ble with that of the dominant firm could one speak about two separate
markets. There should be a case-by-case market analysis. The switch-
101. According to Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, compulsory licensing can be required under
US law where the IP right is deemed to be an essential facility without market leveraging. See
Robert Pitofsky, et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST
L.J. 443, 462 (2002); but see Paul D. Marquardt & Mark Leddy, The Essential Facilities Doctrine
and Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST
L.J. 847, 851 (2003) (To the extent that Section 2 of Sherman Act prohibits monopolization as
opposed to the mere existence of market power, it would appear that the possibility of successful
leveraging in a downstream market is an indispensable requirement in an IP case brought under
Section 2 if the existence of IP rights is to be maintained).
102. The abuse of third markets includes conducts, where an entity attempts to expand its
monopoly in one market to a neighboring one. See Case 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano v.
Commercial Solvents/Commission, 1974 E.C.J. 223 (1974); Case 311/84, Centre Beige d'6tudes de
march6 (Tdltmarketing)/SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise de telediffusion (CLT) v. Info. publicitg
Benelux (IPB), 1985 E.C.J. 3261 (1985).
103. Andreas Heinemann, Compulsory Licenses and Product Integration in European Compe-
tition Law, 36 1IC 2005, 63, 75 (2005). The need for two markets is also stressed by John Temple
Lang. LANG, supra note 102, at 11.
104. See Leistner, supra note 69 at 150,
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ing costs, analyzed by way of thorough market analysis - including
eventual network and lock-in effects - will be the decisive factor in
assessing the indispensability of the de facto monopoly standard.10 5
F. Economic Balancing
An economic analysis at this level should take into consideration
the balance between the ex post allocative efficiency gains, which can
be realized by mandating access, with the ex ante dynamic efficiency
gains, which can be protected by refusing access. 10 6 On one hand,
mandating that a dominant firm that holds an IP right as an essential
facility must share it with one or several competitors will stimulate
competition in downstream markets, thus promoting ex post (alloca-
tive) efficiency. On the other hand, mandatory sharing may reduce the
return of the IP holder and thus decrease its ex ante incentives to in-
vest and compete dynamically.1 07 Exactly at this point, a difficult (and
controversial among economists) economic balancing between the
pro- and anti- competitive effects of a refusal to deal should take
place. 108 There must be an overall balancing, where the gravity of the
hindrance of access to the secondary market should be taken into
consideration.
G. Hypothetical Resolution of Cases through the
Common Language
Let us examine how the above-mentioned thoughts apply in prac-
tice, resolving hypothetically two already existing cases of the ECJ
and the Supreme Court through the use of this common language.
These cases are both pretty recent and have caused long discussions.
1. IMS Health
In IMS Health,109 the ECJ established a rule for the circumstances
when a refusal by a company in a dominant position to grant a copy-
right license will amount to the abuse of their dominant position. In
105. Id. at 154.
106. The rather limited knowledge of the author on economics does not allow him to propose
a specific economic model of analysis, but just the general framework that this analysis should
pursue.
107. See Damien Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 EC: What Can the E. U. Learn from
the U.S. Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko in the Wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deutsche
Telekom, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1519, 1539 (2004).
108. Carl Christian von Weizsacker, Abuse of a Dominant Position and Economic Efficiency,
2003 ZWeR 59 (the general review of the criterion of economic efficiency).
109. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004
E.C.R. 1-5039.
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this case, two German Companies, IMS Health ("IMS") and NDC
Health ("NDC") both collected various data on pharmaceutical sales
and prescriptions. The data provided by IMS to pharmaceutical labo-
ratories was formatted in a particular structure and was distributed
free of charge. In the late 1980's, a director of IMS left to set up
another company which sold data similar to that sold by IMS, and
which worked with very similar structures to IMS. NDC subsequently
acquired the former director's new company. In an action before the
local courts in Germany, it was held that the IMS structure system for
data collection was protected by copyright. However, the national
court held that IMS could not refuse to grant a copyright license to
NDC if such refusal would (under EU law) amount to an abuse of a
dominant position. The national court referred certain questions to
the ECJ in relation to the circumstances under which such behavior
would constitute an abuse of a dominant position.
The first requirement of "possibility of competition by substitution"
is present here, since the competitor is practically incapable of dupli-
cating the product. As it was mentioned in the facts of the case, IMS
had acquired a normal industry standard through its brick structure.
Without access to this structure there was no technical or economical
possibility for NDC to compete." 0 However, the second requirement
of "de facto monopoly on the downstream market" seems to be absent
here. That is, there is no other secondary market in this case; there is
not even a different product.111 The brick-structure does not prevent
the access to another downstream market: there is only one market -
that for pharmaceutical products. Since the second requirement to
find an abuse of IP rights is absent, there would be no need to proceed
to the third requirement, which is an economic balancing the pro- and
anti- competitive effects of the refusal; the refusal is legitimate.
If we applied the above-mentioned thoughts on the IMS Health
case of the ECJ, there would consequently be no room for any anti-
trust violation. 112 Even if one could see two different markets, one in
the sales-data of the pharmaceuticals and another in the structure of
the databank - although the sales-data are worthless without the
structure since there is no independent product - there would not be
the cumulative requirements to excuse an antitrust violation. A flexi-
110. Id. at 28.
111. See, e.g., Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743
(1995) (the "Magill case") (the plaintiff wanted to bring a TV-program listing for the whole
week, in contradiction to the daily TV-programs that the defendants were offering).
112. See Matthias Casper, Die wettbewerbsrechtliche Begrundung von Zwangslizenzen, 166
ZHR 685, 703 (2002).
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ble solution of such a problematic situation, taking also into account
the huge investments of IMS Health in the structure for at least 30
years, could eventually be offered, not by competition law, but by cop-
yright law itself through a narrow application of the idea/expression
distinction at the copyrightability level. An equivalent solution is of-
fered in the U.S. law by the merger and faire-a-scene doctrines.
2. Verizon v. Trinko 113
The facts of the case are as follows:
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposes upon an incumbent
local exchange carrier (LEC) the obligation to share its telephone
network with competitors, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c), including the duty to
provide access to individual network elements on an "unbundled"
basis, see § 251(c)(3). New entrants, so-called competitive LECs,
combine and resell these unbundled network elements (UNEs). Pe-
titioner Verizon Communications Inc., the incumbent LEC in New
York State, has signed interconnection agreements with rivals such
as AT&T, as § 252 obliges it to do, detailing the terms on which it
will make its network elements available. 114
Respondent... Trinko LLP, a New York City law firm, was a local
telephone service customer of AT&T. The day after Verizon en-
tered its consent decree with the FCC, respondent filed a complaint
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, on be-
half of itself and a class of similarly situated customers... The com-
plaint. . .alleged that Verizon had filled rivals' orders on a
discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to dis-
courage customers from becoming or remaining customers of com-
petitive LECs, thus impeding the competitive LECs' ability to enter
and compete in the market for local telephone service.. .The Com-
plainant sought damages and injunctive relief for violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 USC § 2, pursuant to the remedy provisions of
§§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat 731...115
The peculiarity of this case is the existence of a regulatory scheme
(Telecommunication Act), which Justice Scalia assumed to be suffi-
cient for the resolution of this case, thereby avoiding any further anti-
trust analysis. Apart from the Telecommunication Act's Regulation, it
would be interesting to see how the common legal language proposed
here could be applied in this case. The first requirement of "possibility
of competition by substitution" is present here, since the competitor is
practically incapable of duplicating the interconnection service. As the
decision clearly states, "the services allegedly withheld are not other-
113. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
114. Id. at 398.
115. Id. at 404-05.
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wise marketed or available to the public."' 116 Without access to Ver-
izon's platform, there was no technical or economical possibility for
AT&T to compete with Verizon. Moreover, the second requirement
of "de facto monopoly on the downstream market" seems to be pre-
sent here. As the decision notes: "The sharing obligation imposed by
the Telecommunication Act created something brand new: The whole-
sale market for leasing network elements."' 117 In other words, there is
another secondary downstream market in this case where competition
is de facto prohibited because of Verizon's monopoly in the upstream
market. The Court should then proceed to the third requirement,
which is an economic balancing of the pro- and anti- competitive ef-
fects of Verizon's refusal to share interconnection services. The eco-
nomic analysis would most likely result in the mandating of Verizon to
share its services with AT&T and several other competitors, since this
result would stimulate competition in the downstream market for leas-
ing network elements, thus promoting ex post allocative efficiency and
outweighing any short-term ex ante dynamic efficiency gains, which
can be protected by refusing access to Verizon's services.
VI. CONCLUSION
The EC competition law becomes more and more economically ori-
entated with regard to the application of EC Article 82, thus ap-
proaching the situation of U.S. law where an element of
anticompetitive conduct must be present. The idea of an economics-
based antitrust regime is no longer greatly controversial in concept.
This approach makes possible objectivity, predictability, and trans-
parency, although even economic theory does not have all the answers
(and probably never will). 118
Competition law and IP law are converging in their aim to ensure
an optimum balance between the access to markets and the protection
of invention. A model with narrower IP protection and strong compe-
tition policy that intervenes only exceptionally suggests an alternative
model for innovation. The IP rights are thus not protected in ab-
stracto, but as a substantial medium of competition. If the advantages
of the IP system are outweighed by the disadvantages from competi-
tion by substitution, only negative effects of competition by imitation
remain. It is then a matter of systematic approach if the resolution to
the problem of the absence of any competition is offered internally
116. Id. at 410.
117. Id.
118. Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 378 (2005).
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through IP law - like in the U.S. through the doctrines of merger and
misuse - or externally through competition law, like in EU law. The
best solution would consist of limiting the IP right to its appropriate
scope through a flexible IP-related approach, such as the misuse doc-
trine, thus relying on the theory of complementary goals of IP and
competition law.
However, an American-type synthesis of intellectual property and
competition law is more difficult in Europe because the European
Union currently possesses a Union-wide competition law, but mostly
national intellectual property laws. As a result, it is more difficult for
the varying national intellectual property policies to be incorporated
into the construction of Union-wide competition law. It is also diffi-
cult, albeit not impossible, for the national courts to incorporate Euro-
pean competition policy concerns into their national intellectual
property laws. These impediments to harmonization within Europe, of
intellectual property law with competition law, mean that the interac-
tions of these two sets of laws are likely to produce a less than effi-
cient result.
What is made clear through the use of common legal language be-
tween US and EU law is that this common language can be also used
to describe situations on the interface between IP and competition
law. These two distinct fields of law can use common terms to describe
and resolve cases in their intersection, such as when they are dealing
with situations where IP law has to take into account competition pol-
icy issues. And these situations are numerous if somebody considers
the cases referring to the misuse, merger, faire-a-scene doctrines and
functionality problems.
In the case of network effects, where competition by substitution is
not possible, the right holder's freedom to license would result in
overbroad protection and the IP right does not have the capacity to
promote dynamic competition. Therefore law has to postulate a duty
to license the IP right to the competitors at reasonable fees. In these
rare market situations in which IP protection does not reach its goal of
promoting dynamic efficiency, a duty to deal should be accepted so as
to guarantee at least allocative efficiency. From an economic point of
view, such a compulsory licensing should take place if exploitation by
the licensee has allocative advantages in comparison to exploitation
by the right owner and there is de facto no competition by imitation
anymore.1 19
119. Josef Drexl, IMS Health and Trinko - Antitrust Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound
Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases, 35 I, 'L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETION L.IIC 788,
807 (2004).
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The copyright was not the cause of IMS Health's dominant position,
even in the market for the copyright in the brick structure. The prob-
lem is that the lock-in effect excludes any other method of collecting
data from the relevant market. In such a situation where a company
holds market power, the company, by definition, will not feel pressure
to innovate or it will be incited to create barriers to entry for potential
competitors and forget to improve its own products by continued in-
troduction of superior technology in the market. Still, competition
may be restored by allowing imitation. Although the exclusive right is
not the cause of market power, the competition problem may be
cured by restricting the exercise of the exclusive right.120
The rationale for the imposition of a duty to deal under these cir-
cumstances is not to create competition in the market which is the
subject of the intellectual property protection, for that exclusivity is
indeed within the statutory monopoly conferred by the patent or cop-
yright statutes. Rather, it is to allow competition in complementary
markets which are not within the scope of the patent or copyright mo-
nopoly. Patent and copyright owners will continue to be able to ex-
ploit fully the monopoly conferred by those grants, and they will be
limited only in attempts to extend that monopoly beyond the proper
scope of the grant. Therefore, the holder of a dominant position has to
make considerable efforts to keep the barriers to entry in the neigh-
boring markets as low as possible. The solution is to keep the relevant
markets as open as possible.' 21 This result would best advance the
principal goal of the antitrust laws - and one which is hardly inconsis-
tent with patent or copyright law - of increasing competition and max-
imizing consumer welfare.
120. Hanns Ullrich, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Gemeinsamen Markt,
1EG-WETTBEWERBSRECHT 1250 (1997).
121. Andreas Heinemann, Compulsory Licenses and Product Integration in European Compe-
tition Law, 36 IIC 2005, 63, 75 (2005).
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